Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Faculty Scholarship

2015

The Alignment of Law and Norms: Of Mirrors,
Bulwarks, and Pressure Valves
Mark A. Edwards
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, mark.edwards@mitchellhamline.edu

Publication Information
10 FIU Law Review 19 (2015)
Repository Citation
Edwards, Mark A., "The Alignment of Law and Norms: Of Mirrors, Bulwarks, and Pressure Valves" (2015). Faculty Scholarship. 408.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/408

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.

The Alignment of Law and Norms: Of Mirrors, Bulwarks, and Pressure
Valves
Abstract

Why does law mirror norms sometimes, but other times not? This article examines two types of intervening
factors that sometimes cause a persistent misalignment between law and norms: pressure valves and bulwarks.
Pressure valves are mechanisms that relieve the pressure placed on the law to change despite a gap with social
norms. Pressure valves are found in two distinct social phenomena.
First, pressure on law to change to reflect social norms is relieved when law is not enforced against behavior
that is illegal, but socially acceptable. Formally deviant acts that are socially acceptable often do not generate
an enforcement response. Legal institutions tend to enforce not law, but limits of socially acceptable deviance
from the law. Because the popular experience of law lies in its enforcement, the gap between law and norms is
not experienced to the majority of the populace if standards of social acceptability, rather than law, are
enforced.
Second, pressure on law to change to reflect social norms is relieved when social norms are enforced against
behavior that is legal but socially unacceptable. If legal behavior that is socially unacceptable is successfully
sanctioned through norm enforcement, it will not occur, and the pressure to change the law to reflect norms
will be lessened.
In contrast to pressure valves, bulwarks are forces that buttress the resistance of law against pressure to change,
despite a gap between law and social norms. There are at least two identifiable bulwarks.
First, political capture prevents a change in law to reflect social norms when the mechanisms of legal change
are controlled by a highly-interested minority group that benefits from the law as is. Political capture will
buttress law against pressure to align with norms.
The second bulwark is the protection of fundamental rights, through which non-democractic institutions such
as courts remove from the purview of popular will some behaviors that are socially unacceptable. Through the
recognition of fundamental rights, courts protect the legality of some behaviors despite their violation of
social norms.
Gaps between law and social norms are neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad; all depends on their
cause. If we can predictably identify which factors are preventing law from changing to reflect social norms, we
will at least have a better understanding of the relationship between law and society. Better yet, we may be
alerted to warning signs that any particular persistent gap is a bug rather than a feature of the system.
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The Alignment of Law and Norms:
Of Mirrors, Bulwarks, and Pressure Valves
Mark A. Edwards*
I. INTRODUCTION

It has long been argued that law is derived from social norms.' If that
is true, law and norms should reflect each other. Brian Tamanaha refers to
this as "the mirror thesis:" law is a formalized reflection of informal social
norms. 2
But as Tamanaha and many others have persuasively argued, the
mirror thesis is frequently, demonstrably inaccurate. There are often
significant gaps between law and norms.3
Perhaps gaps are due only to time; eventually, law will change to
reflect norms. And, indeed, sometimes that is actually observable; norms
evolve and law follows.
But not always.
Sometimes gaps between law and norms are
persistent. What accounts for that persistence? Why does law change to
reflect norms sometimes, but other times not?
This article attempts to answer that question. It argues that most of the
time, a gap between law and social norms does, in fact, place pressure on
the law to change to better reflect social norms. However, there are
predictable, identifiable intervening factors that may cause persistent gaps.
This article attempts to identify those factors, and to predict when they
might cause a persistent gap between law and norms.
This article argues that the intervening factors come in two types:
"bulwarks" and "pressure valves."
Pressure valves are mechanisms that relieve the pressure placed on the
law to change despite a gap with social norms. There are at least two
identifiable types of pressure valves.
One type of pressure valve is selective enforcement. Pressure on law
to change to reflect social norms is relieved when law is not enforced

*
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1 See, e.g., MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed. & trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1954); Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law 82 (1985); see also Joseph

Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 105 (1979)
2

See BRIAN TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 2 (2001).

3

Id. at 109.
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against behavior that is illegal, but socially acceptable. Formally illegal
acts that are socially acceptable often do not generate an enforcement
response. Legal institutions tend to enforce not law, but limits of socially
acceptable deviance from the law. Because the popular experience of law
lies in its enforcement, the gap between law and norms is not experienced
by the majority of the populace if standards of social acceptability, rather
than law, are enforced.
A second type of pressure valve is vigilantism. Pressure on law to
change to reflect social norms is relieved when social norms are enforced
against behavior that is legal but socially unacceptable. If legal behavior
that is socially unacceptable is successfully sanctioned through norm
enforcement, it will not occur, and the pressure to change the law to reflect
norms will be lessened.
Bulwarks are forces that buttress the resistance of law against pressure
to change, despite a gap between law and social norms. Like pressure
valves, bulwarks come in at least two identifiable types.
One type of bulwark is political capture, which prevents a change in
law to reflect social norms when the mechanisms of legal change are
controlled by a highly-interested minority group that benefits from the law
as is. Political capture will buttress law against pressure to align with
norms. Generations of political and social science scholars have recognized
the existence of political capture.'
A second bulwark is the protection of fundamental rights, through
which non-democratic institutions such as courts remove from the purview
of popular will the power to legally sanction some behaviors that are
socially unacceptable.
In other words, through the recognition of
fundamental rights, courts protect the legality of some behaviors despite
their violation of social norms.
This Article argues that gaps between law and social norms are neither
intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad; all depends on their cause. If we
can predictably identify which factors are preventing law from changing to
reflect social norms, we will at least have a better understanding of the
relationship between law and society. Better yet, we may be alerted to
warning signs that any particular persistent gap is a bug rather than a feature
of the system.
Gaps that persist because of the protection of fundamental rights are

&

4 See Mark A. Edwards, Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights, 43 CONN. L. REv. 457
(2010); Mark A. Edwards, Law and the Parameters of Acceptable Deviance, 97 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2006).

5 See, e.g., Alan Stone, The Place ofLaw in the Marxian Structure-SuperstructureArchetype, 19
LAW & SOC'Y REv. 39 (1985); Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and
Underpinnings, 36 J. Leg. Educ. 505 (1986); see also generally, DANIEL A. FARBER AND PHILIP P.
FRIcKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
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usually a feature of the system. Gaps due to political capture are generally
bugs. Gaps due to the non-enforcement of law against behavior that is
formally deviant but socially acceptable may be harmless, but may also
indicate a dangerous and pernicious bug: the selective enforcement of
formal law against minority populations for behavior that is generally
socially acceptable. We should be alert to that possibility whenever we see
enforcement at the bounds of socially acceptable deviance rather than law.
Finally, gaps between law and norms that persist because of informal
sanctions against behaviors that are legal but socially unacceptable may be
harmless, but they may also indicate the presence of a bug: the
circumvention of the protection of fundamental rights through acts of
vigilantism.
Section II of this article reviews the literature of the mirrors thesis and
its critiques. Section III explores the use of prediction as means for
understanding the dynamic relationship between law and society. Section
IV discusses the application of predictive models to the mirror thesis.
Section V examines the typologies of bulwarks and pressure valves that
cause persistent gaps between law and social norms. Section VI analyzes
the danger signals that may allow us to predict that any particular persistent
gap is a bug in the system rather than a feature.
II. THE MIRROR THESIS & GAPS BETWEEN LAW AND NORMS

Norms, it is frequently supposed, pre-exist law, which eventually
6
grows from norms and evolves to mirror them. Law is said to mirror social
norms because law is the formal embodiment of a society's informal
preferences, desires, and notions of order and justice. Indeed, Max Weber
described law as the institutionalized enforcement of norms.7 Similarly,
Joseph Raz defines law as "an institutionalized normative system,"' and
Kent Greenawalt has gone so far as to assume that law reflects dominant
cultural norms, unless it is "imposed from the outside by an alien power." 9
As Brian Tamanaha has explained, "almost every major strain of Western
legal and social theory has articulated, or taken for granted, an account of
the relationship between law and society as one of close integration and
association. It is widely assumed that law reflects and mirrors society, and
operates to maintain social order."' 0

6
Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 52 ("According to this account, positive law emerges, in the haze
of long forgotten yesteryear, as a distinct mechanism of institutionalized norm enforcement out of the
customary order that prevailed in pre-political society.").
7
Weber, supra note 1, at 13.
8

JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 105 (1979).

9

KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 165 (1992).

10

Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 51.
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Tamanaha calls this "the mirror thesis."" In Tamanaha's view, the
mirror thesis has several distinct but closely related and sometimes overlapping versions: "(1) as a historical matter, positive law evolved out of a
social order controlled mostly by customs and habits; (2) the content of
positive law norms are the products of, or derived from, customs and
practices; (3) positive laws which are inconsistent with customs, usages or
habits will be ineffectual or illegitimate; and, at the extreme, (4) customs,
habits, and usages are law."1 2 Roscoe Pound seems to have had something
very much like the mirror thesis in mind when he noted that in any conflict
between law and social norms, social norms would eventually prevail. 3
As Tamanaha argues, there are reasons to doubt the empirical accuracy
of the mirror thesis. Tamanaha argues that there exists a "fundamental
disconnect between law and society" for at least three reasons. 14 First, legal
systems may represent the interests of those who control political and
economic systems, without reference to the norms of a given society. This
would happen in a society in which the popular will could not be expressed
democratically into law. As Tamanaha notes, the most well-known and
strident of these views is the Marxist critique of capitalist legal systems.
Marx himself described the content of capitalist law as merely the
expressed will of the ruling classes, designed to reinforce the social
conditions that created its privilege.'
Second, legal systems in the post-colonial world are as likely to have
been imposed by (or copied from) a foreign culture, as they are to grow
organically from the norms of a particular society or culture. Tamanaha's
experience in Yap, Micronesia, where law had been transplanted from the
United States, is illustrative: "The day-to-day behaviour of the people was
not governed by state law, but by their own cultural norms. Social order
was maintained by sources other than state law. They did not identify with
the legal system in any way."' 6 In his view, "the majority of state legal
systems in existence today originated through imposition from outside or
were created by imitation by local authorities to meet the threat posed by
conquest from outside powers."' 7 And indeed, Tamanaha's claims are
borne out in Stuart Banner's careful studies of the interaction between

I

Id at 1.

12

Id. at 5. That last and most extreme position is perhaps most closely identified with Ehrlich,
who maintained that law that does not mirror social norms "has lost its superior entitlement to the claim
of being the law, and the label must be given back, or at least shared with the 'living law,' the actually
lived social norms" that order society. Id. at 31.
13
Roscoe Pound, The Needfor a SociologicalJurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 615 (1907).
14
Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 109.
15
16
17

Id at 41.
Id at 145.
Id at 69.
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colonial and indigenous legal systems in countries such as New Zealand.'
Third, legal systems may be created and maintained by legal
technocrats-lawyers and bureaucrats-who are guided by norms of their
profession rather than their wider culture. Complex regulatory details for
particular industries, after all, are unlikely to be traceable to norms of a
particular culture.19
As a result of these pervasive disconnects between the producers of
law and those governed by it, Tamanaha argues that 'gaps' between law and
social norms are the rule, not exceptions. 2 0 He rejects "the sense that the
presence of a gap consists of a deviation, that even if it is a regular
occurrence, it is still an aberrant or marginal phenomenon relative to the
normal state of the law." 2 1 Eugene Ehrlich, whose concept of "living law"
was based upon the distinction between rules of conduct (based on custom)
and rules of decision (based on positive law), would also likely predict that
the "gaps" far outweigh the convergences between norms and law.22
But perhaps Tamanaha's critique does not so much dispute the mirror
thesis as modify it: what the mirror reflects is not the norms of society
generally, but rather the interests of the privileged few who are,
metaphorically, hogging it. The problem is not that the law does not act as
a mirror, but rather that the mirror cannot reflect what it cannot see. The
norms of a society may not be reflected in law because its members have no
access to the law, other than as its subjects. In the other words, law is still a
mirror, but all that it reflects are the interests of those with the power to
shape it.
In this way, each counter-example to the mirror thesis seems to be an
exception that suggests a useful rule: we might predict that, absent some
reason otherwise such as those discussed above, and given sufficient time,
the law will mirror the norms of the culture from which it emerges.
Moreover, by turning our focus to prediction, it makes little difference
18 Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New
Zealand, 24 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 807 (1999). There was, until relatively recently, a trend in western
legal scholarship to assume that legal systems that do not look like ours-that are based less on statutory
and common law and more upon norm and custom-must be on their way to looking like ours, as they
evolve from more primitive to more sophisticated. As Tamanaha says, "If the evolutionary account has
initial plausibility, it is the result of the fact that it plays to, and is built upon, stereotypes of what
primitive life was like, and upon the common notion that primitive (or non-Westem) society stands in
relation to modem (or Western) society as a child does to an adult." Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 61.
19
As Tamanaha argues, "a great deal of economic-related legislation has no counterpart in
social customs." He cites as examples "laws prohibiting monopolistic behavior" and "law relating to the
regulation of securities." Id. at 88. In this context, though, it may be that Tamanaha is demanding too
exact a correspondence between norms and law. After all, law prohibiting monopolistic behavior may
be rooted in norms of fairness, and laws regulating securities may be rooted in norms of honesty.

20
21

Id at 132.
Id at 132.

22

Id at 89 (arguing that the purpose of Ehrlich's work "was to emphasize that positive law rules

and lived social customs regularly diverge").
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whether mirrors or gaps are the exception or the rule. The aim here is not to
decide that question, but rather to analyze whether gaps between law and
norms occur predictably.
III. PREDICTION AND THE REALIST LEGACY

Oliver Wendell Holmes is commonly identified as among the first of
the prominent American Legal Realists saying openly what many-but not
all-may have privately thought: that the common law was not a reduction
to words of the dictates of nature and logic, but merely a means of
achieving certain ends, designed and implemented by men according to
their desires.23 Because the law is a means to an end, Holmes said, we can
predict its path: "the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men" would inevitably
determine the path along which the law would develop.24 The object of
studying law, Holmes said, is to predict its path in particular instances:
"The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence
of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts." 25 To Holmes,
according to Posner, law itself was best understood not as a set of rules, but
"simply a prediction of how state power will be deployed in particular
circumstances"26 or, as D'Amato describes, "the probability that [a] rule
will be affirmed by a court in the future." 2 7
23
It is difficult to believe now that the jurisprudence espoused by as staid a figure as Oliver
Wendell Holmes was once considered radical, and that a vision of law that seems obvious might have
been revolutionary. See Brian Bix, Legal Philosophy in America, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 555-6 (2009) ("If it was once subversive to think that extra-legal factors
influence judicial decisions, it now seems naive to doubt it. . . . This view now seems so obvious and so
much a matter of common sense that it hard to comprehend how it could have once been
controversial."); but see Brian Tamanaha, The Realism of the Formalist' Age, ST. JOHN'S UNIV.
SCHOOL OF LAW (Aug. 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=985083 (arguing
persuasively that many legal scholars held views of judicial decision-making that were remarkably
"realist" for an allegedly formalist era, and that the caricature of the formalist era was in some ways a
strawman used by early Legal Realists to bring their own views into greater relief). Nonetheless,
Tamanaha himself has argued that Holmes's instrumental vision of law stood in opposition to formalist
vision of law: that it "is, in some sense, given; that the law is immanent; that the process of law-making
is not one of creation but of discovery; that law is not the product of human will; that law has a kind of
autonomy and internal integrity; that the law is, in some sense, objectively determined." BRIAN
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 5 (2006).

Tamanaha's

insight fully deconstructs that view into two strands: one that saw law as the embodiment of natural
rights, the other that saw law as the "expression or manifestation of commonly shared values," a type of
refined custom embodying ancient shared values and created through common consent. The first view
is antithetical to the Realist vision; the second can, with slight modification, fit comfortably within it.
24

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (2005).

25

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).

26

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 223 (1993).

27

Anthony D'Amato, A New (andBetter) InterpretationofHolmes's Prediction Theory ofLaw

7 (Nw. UNIV.

SCHOOL OF LAW SCHOLARLY COMMONS, Working Paper No. 763, 2008), http://
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But it is striking how narrow Holmes's conception of the use of
prediction is as a tool of jurisprudence. To Holmes, prediction is used to
calculate a rough probability that a judge will decide a particular case in a
particular way.28
Other realists, such as torts scholar Leon Green,
broadened the focus of prediction from judge to "factual scenarios-the
'situation-types'-in which harms occur: e.g. 'surgical operations,' 'traffic
and transportation' and the like" to predict "patterns of torts decisions for
each recurring situation-type that courts encounter." 2 9 But like Holmes,
Green's focus was trier-of-fact centric: he was concerned with predicting
how a trier-of-fact would decide a case of a particular situation-type.
Neither Holmes nor his followers used prediction as an instrument to
anticipate the very thing the title of his most famous work promises: the
path of the law itself, beyond how a trier-of-fact was likely to decide any
case or type of case.30 The early realists, in other words, saw prediction as a
means to anticipate adjudicatory outcomes, rather than to test our
understanding of how and why law exists and changes as it does. This may
be the result of the realists' almost singular focus on common law rather
than on statutes. This absence is striking, because the path of the law writ
large depends much more upon the decisions of legislatures than of courts,
even if the courts act simultaneously as instruments of law's interpretation
and enforcement.
The absence of prediction regarding what kinds of law might be
created by legislatures may also stem in part from a strand of realism
identified in particular with the work of Jerome Frank, who argued that the
path of law would follow the predilections and idiosyncrasies of the judge.3
Thus, the path of law was essentially unpredictable in the absence of
information about the views of any particular judge and the social milieu in
which the judge existed.3 2 It may also stem from the realists focus on the
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/163.
D'Amato provocatively describes
Holmes's prediction theory as a "quantum theory;" as quantum mechanics describes the physical world
as a consisting entirely of probabilities, so Holmes described law itself as consisting of probability, and
nothing more.
28
As Duxbury notes, Holmes's conception of the use of prediction is intensely pragmatic: the
lawyer uses it to advise a particular client about the likely consequences of a particular course of
conduct.

Neil Duxbury, Law and Prediction, 87 ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. OF LAW AND SOC. POL'Y 402,

409. See also Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties ofNew Legal Realism: Can A New World
Order PromptA New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 73 (2009) (describing as "the core claim
of realism that doctrine is necessary but insufficient to explain judging.").
29

Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in BLACKWELL'S GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 55 (Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson, eds., 2004).
30
First a speech, later published under the title The Path ofthe Law in Harvard Law Review.
31
See Leiter, supranote 29, at 10-11.
32
In this regard, realists may have fallen prey to an error that Morris Cohen foresaw: "they who
scorn the idea of the judge as a logical automaton are apt to fall into the opposite error of exaggerating
as irresistible the force of bias or prejudice." Morris Cohen, The Place ofLogic in the Law, 29 HARV. L.
REV. 622, 638 (1916), quoted in Brian Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism at 48. But as
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problem of properly advising clients, based on predictions about what a
judge will do in a particular case.3 3 Clients, after all, do not usually care
about the historical sweep of the law writ large-they care about winning or
losing a particular case, or about engaging in, or not engaging in, a
particular course of conduct at a particular point in time.
Other realists, following in Holmes's path, imagined broader uses for
prediction in the study of law. First, if it was true that a lawyer might
predict a judge's interpretation of the law, and thus the consequences of a
particular course of conduct for his client, then it was also true that the state
might predict the likelihood that the client would engage in that conduct if
apprised of the likely consequences. Thus law could be designed to not
merely to punish unwanted conduct, but finely tuned to prevent it, if the
state could predict the correct quantum of potential punishment required to
deter the client's potential conduct.34
Second, and more pertinent for purposes of this article, scholars such
as John Bingham considered the use of prediction as a means for the socialscientific study of law.35 They wrote of the need for "empirical testing:
hypotheses had to be tested against observations of the world."3 6 But, as
Duxbury argues, realists such as Bingham also seem to have had in mind a
particular and limited end for the deployment of prediction as a scientific
tool: "increased legal certainty and social control." 3 7 Indeed, prediction is
treated less as a means of scientific study and more as "a tool of the
pragmatic social engineer, a means by which to achieve more effective
social control." 38 In other words, prediction was turned outward, focusing
not on the development of law itself but on the law's anticipated effect on
the behavior of its subjects.
Public choice theory (including critical legal theory) has at its core a
predictive belief: distrustful of the political process, it predicts that capture
by powerful interests will produce legislation that serves those interests.
Tamanaha explains, just as scholars of the so-called formalist age weren't so enamored of the law's
internal logic as we now portray them, so too early realists were not as scornful of traditional legal
reasoning as we now imagine them. As Roscoe Pound wrote, "It is just as unreal to refuse to see the
extent to which legal technique, with all its faults, applied to authoritative legal materials, with all of
their defects, keeps down the logical or irrational element or holds it to tolerable limits in practice.",
quoted in Brian Z. Tamanaha, UnderstandingLegal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REv. 731, 782 (2009); see also
Leiter, supra note 29, at 8.
33
See Leiter, supra note 29, at 29.
34

Duxbury, supra note 28, at 411.
Id
36
Leiter, supra note 29, at 3. As Leiter notes, however, for most realists the "commitment to
'science' and 'scientific methods' was more a matter of rhetoric and metaphor than actual scholarly
practice." Id. at 51.
37
Duxbury, supra note 28, at 411.
38 Id. at 418; see also Hanoch Dagan, Restitution's Realism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
35

OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 54 ("Since Holmes's The Path ofthe Law, realists have placed coerciveness at
the center of their conception of law.").
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Similarly, neoclassical law-and-economics is at its heart a predictive theory.
Assuming, as it does, that an actor is rational, it is predictable that s/he will
choose to act in a particular way in response to certain stimuli.3 9 However,
the assumptions upon which the neoclassical law and economics model is
based, and which thus empower it to predict, smack more of formalism than
realism in that they seem contentedly divorced from reality.4 0 Among those
assumptions: that actors behave rationally, that rational actors act in a way
that maximizes their wealth, that markets composed of individual rational
actors acting to maximize their wealth are self-correcting and express the
desires of a society without the necessity of state intervention. As Nourse
and Schaffer aptly point out, these assumptions call forth Roscoe Pound's
famous denunciation of formalist legal theory as being based upon
"rigorous logical deduction from predetermined conceptions in disregard of
and often in the teeth of actual facts." 4 1
Because the assumptions of the neoclassical law and economics model
are unlikely, they call into question the predictive power of the model.
Critics of the model, such as those within the behavioral economics school,
have attempted to adjust its assumptions by showing that actors cannot be
assumed to be rational, and in fact will behave irrationally in predictable
42
However, behavioral economics adherents have fallen short in their
ways.
efforts to comprehensively address the shortcomings of the neoclassical law
and economics model in at least three ways. First, although through
cognitive psychology its proponents have been able to identify some limited
instances in which actors will behave predictably irrationally, they have not
been able to explain a great deal of seemingly irrational behavior. Second,
like the law and economics model itself, behavioral economics is "micro"
in its focus on the motives of individual actors; it does not offer "macro"
level predictions other than as the assumed agglomeration of "micro"
predictions.
Third, behavioral law and economics shares with its
neoclassical predecessor the use of prediction as an outward looking tool: it
39
See Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive
Economics 4 (1953) (describing the assumption of rational self-interest as "a system of generalizations
that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances").
40

See NEIL DUXBURY,

PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

373 (1995)

("A further

common criticism of the rational self-interest thesis is that it is clearly contradicted by reality.").
41
Nourse and Schaffer, Varieties ofNew Legal Realism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 112 (quoting
Roscoe Pound, Liberty ofContract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 462 (1909)).
42
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1556
(2004); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003);
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect andLegal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). Because of
this insight, behavioral law and economics adherents tend to countenance a greater role for the state than
their neoclassical forebears. If we cannot assume that people behave rationally, and in fact must
acknowledge that they will behave irrationally in predictable ways, then private transactions are unlikely
to produce an optimal result; the corrective force of the state is needed. See Nourse and Schaffer, supra
note 41, at 109.
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is used to predict the behavior of law's subject in response to law, but not to
the path of the law itself.
The potential uses of prediction as a tool of jurisprudence are more
expansive than that. Prediction is useful as a means of testing the quality of
our understanding of law and legal systems. More or less accurate
prediction of the path of the law writ large suggests-but certainly does not
establish-that our understanding of the systematic relationship among
various forces that influence that path is accurate.4 3 More importantly,
where the path of law deviates from its predicted course, we may be able
identify the operation of impediments to that course.44 Moreover, these
impediments may themselves arise predictably.
The law and society movement in many ways represents the best of the
continuing legal realist tradition. It addresses directly, by a variety of
methodologies, the core of the legal realist idea-that law is a "going
institution distinguished by the difficult accommodation of three
constitutive yet irresolvable tensions: between power and reason, science
and craft, and tradition and progress." 45 It is somewhat startling, then, to
see that law and society scholars have not made greater use of prediction as
a tool for understanding the path of the law.
I suspect that this is the result of two influences within the law and
society movement. First, for critical and other public choice theorists,
prediction may be implicit within the foundations of their theory: law will
develop in whatever way best serves the interests of those who capture the
power to make it.4 6 But that view is notably lacking in the nuance that is
supposed to characterize both legal realism and law and society scholarship.
As Hanoch Dagan writes, legal realism rejects the reductive image of law,
which portrays it "as sheer power (or interest, or politics)." 47 Rather,
realists argue that law "is also a forum of reason, and that reason poses
real-albeit elusive-constraints . . . on the exercise of state power. Law is
never only about interest or power politics; it is also an exercise in reasongiving." 48 At the same time, however, a realistic view of law necessarily
requires skepticism that "reason can displace interest, or that law can
exclude all force except that of the better argument. . . . [R]eason and
coerciveness are deemed to coexist in any credible account of law." The
focus, then, of predicting law's path is not to assume that it with always

43
Oscar Kaplan, Predictionin the Social Sciences, 7 PHIL. OF SCI. 492, 492 (1940) ("The ability
to predict events within its field indicates that a science has reached a high level of development, that its
essential facts stand in systematic relationship to each other.").
44
See id. at 494 (1940) ("[U]nsuccessful prediction" is useful because "until we attempt to
predict, we have no way of knowing whether all the operative variables are under observation.").
45
Dagan, supranote 38, at 3.
46
See Tushnet, supranote 5.
47
48

Dagan, supranote 38, at 4.
Id at 4.

2014]

The Alignment ofLaw and Norms

29

follow the path of reason, or the path of power. Neither alone can account
for law's path.
Second, law and society has embraced study of the law from "the
bottom up," focusing not on the law writ large but on the lives of those who
live in its shadow. 49 This ethnographic, anthropological focus does not lend
itself well to grand theories that predict behavior, which are then tested;
rather, the close study of behavior is used to construct theory.o The
imposition of a theory that is expected to describe the behavior of law's
subjects may seem both presumptuous and imperialistic.
To answer that objection, it is important to emphasize that the utility of
prediction-as a tool for understanding the forces that determine the path of
the law-is not dependent upon the accuracy of its forecasts. Rather, its
utility lies in revealing where unforeseen variables are at work, so that our
understanding of the forces that determine law's path deepens. In this
sense, prediction is more useful, and thus has been used as a tool more
successfully, where it is accurate in its forecast in some ways, and
inaccurate in others. Prediction, as we should use the term, is simply a tool
that promotes discovery.5 Used in this way, prediction provides a helpful
complement to the inductive, bottom-up hypothesis formation characteristic
of ethnographic research. Prediction necessarily commits us, however
temporarily, to a particular position. Thus it can tell us where we are wrong
and suggest where we should dig to find out why. It is not a tool that
verifies the accuracy of a theory, other than rarely and incidentally.5 2
In particular, when there exists a gap between law and norms, we can
attempt to predict when law will change to reflect norms, and when it will
not. That will allow us to test our understanding of the relationship
49

See, e.g., SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH

(1978); Christine Harrington and Barbara Yngvesson, Interpretive Sociolegal Research, 15 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 135 (1990).
50

See id.; see also LAuRA NADER, THE LIFE OF LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS (2005).

But see Nourse and Schaffer, supra note 41, at 85 ("the measure of success of many studies is
not 'prediction' and verification (indeed, it can be viewed as the opposite of prediction). Rather, the
measure is discovery."). As I understand Nourse and Schaffer, they use the term "prediction" to mean a
tool used to verify a theory, whereas "discovery" means the uncovering of previously-not-contemplated,
relevant information.
52
In this sense, prediction is distinct from the epistemological concept known as predictivism.
51

Predictivism, according to Eric Barnes, "hold that, where evidence E confirms theory T, E confirms T
more strongly when E is predicted on the basis of T and subsequently confirmed than when E is known
in advance of T's formation and 'used,' in some sense, in the formulation of T." Eric Barnes, Social
Predictivism, 45 ERKENNTIS 69, 69 (1996). In other words, predictivism holds that a theory that
accurately predicts behavior is more valuable than a theory constructed post-hoc, on the basis of
accumulated evidence. The central tenet of predictivism, that "correctly predicting data confers greater
confirmation" on a theory than merely "accommodating data" within it, is a matter of considerable
controversy. David Harker, On the Predilections for Predictions, 59 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 429, 429 (2008).
What is not controversial, however, is the use of prediction as a tool for promoting the discovery of new
data. In my use of the terms, legal ethnographers would be justified in rejecting predictivism, but not in
rejecting the use of prediction as a tool that promotes the discovery of new data.
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between law and norms, and how their interaction produces social order.
It is worth predicting that as a society's norms change, a change in law
will eventually follow, not because it is likely to be accurate (though it may
be), but because it is useful. Even if we start with the artificial presumption
that law will follow and reflect norms, we might be able to predict the
circumstances under which it will happen, and the circumstances under
which it will not. Nor is this a prescriptive claim that law should mirror
social norms; it simply asks whether or not it does, and if not, why not.

Predcted Changes inLaw Caused byhngior

IV. PREDICTION AND THE MIRROR THESIS

For purposes of this discussion, I need to define some terms. "Formal
law" is law (including rules and regulations) that is codified or is the
product of judicial decision-making. A "formal sanction" is either a penalty
that may be imposed by the state pursuant to its police power, or legal
liability that may be imposed by private actors through the facility of a state
institution. An "informal sanction" is a cost imposed by private actors,
without the facility of state institutions. "Illegal behavior" is behavior that
may be subject to a formal sanction. "Normatively acceptable behavior" is
behavior that most people in a community, society, or polity find
unobjectionable. "Normatively unacceptable behavior" is behavior that
most people in a community, society or polity find objectionable.
As we know, according to the mirror thesis, law should evolve to align
with norms, so that law mirrors the normative sensibilities of society. From
that premise, the simple model below predicts that law change should
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following changes in normative acceptability of behaviors. If behavior that
was socially acceptable becomes socially unacceptable, that should prompt
a should change in law as well, so that the behavior becomes illegal.
Similarly, if behavior that was socially acceptable becomes socially
unacceptable, that should prompt a change in law as well, so that the
behavior becomes illegal. On the model, that means that if a behavior
moves from top to bottom, or bottom to top, it should then (eventually) turn
the corner, too.
A subtler model would likely recognize that changes in law and
changes in norms can become mutually reinforcing. That is true for at least
two reasons.
First, the legality of a behavior is often taken as a strong signal of its
social acceptability. An authoritative declaration that a behavior is legal
may be understood by the general populace as a strong indicator that the
behavior both is, and ought to be, socially acceptable.
Similarly, an
authoritative declaration that a behavior is illegal may be understood by the
general populace as a strong indicator that the behavior both is, and ought
to be, socially unacceptable. As Tamanaha notes, "law has sometimes
taken the lead in opposing or reforming prevailing customs or moral norms"
and "has a role in shaping customs and morality." 53 This type of mutually
reinforcing dynamic makes it very difficult to differentiate between the
chicken and egg of change: it is hard to say whether changes in law first
produced changes in normative acceptability, or changes in normative
acceptability first produced changes in law. But regardless of which came
first, there is no reason to think this mutually reinforcing cycle does not
continue until law and norms are aligned.

53

Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 7.
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Change in Law (Caused by Change in Norms)
Reinforces Change in Norms
Legal

Illegal

Norntive~y Acceptable

Nomtively Unacptble

Second, law obeying is often considered a normative good in itself,
regardless of the content of the law. Therefore, regardless of the social
acceptability of the underlying behavior at issue, engaging in it unlawfully
may be socially unacceptable.
We can actually observe the mirror thesis in action: changes in limits
of normatively acceptable behavior sometimes, eventually, produce changes
in law as well. Consider, for example, the legalization of same-sex
marriage.
As the data compiled from Gallup and Pew polls below shows,
marriage between people of the same gender has moved from being largely
socially unacceptable in the United States to being largely socially
acceptable. That movement was clear but neither unimpeded nor sudden. It
seems beyond doubt that the process of normative and legal change
regarding same-sex marriage was sometimes mutually reinforcing, but at
other times the movement of normative acceptability was in defiance of
legal retrenchment.
Between 1998 and 2008, as some state courts
recognized the rights of same-sex couples, 30 states passed constitutional
amendments banning recognition of same-sex marriages.5 4 But as both the
Pew and Gallup polls indicate, by sometime around 2011, the normative
acceptability of same-sex marriage had definitively changed; a behavior
that had once been squarely within the lower-right, normatively

54
Former U.S. state constitutional amendments banning same-sex unions, https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Former U.S._state constitutional amendments banningsamesex unions&oldid=676612040 (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
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unacceptable / illegal quadrant of the model, to the upper-right, normatively
acceptable / illegal quadrant.
Should same sex couples be allowed to marry?
100%
Margin of error: 4

90%
80%
709
609
50%
40%
30%
20

10%
0%
1996 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 201E
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Oppose

5 5

Gallup.

55
In response to the question, "Do you think marriages between same-sex couples should or
should be not recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?" US.
Support for Gay Marriage Stable after High Court Ruling, GALLUP (Jul. 17, 2015), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/I84217/support-gay-marriage-stable-highcourt-ruling.aspx.
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Should same sex couples be allowed to marry?
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The mirror thesis would predict that over time, following a change in
the normative or social acceptability of a behavior, and absent some
intervening factor, law should change as well. That change is clearly
observable in the context of same-sex marriage. Four years after a samesex marriage became normatively acceptable, the United States Supreme
Court itself recognized that same-sex couples have a constitutionally
protected right to marry.
Note that occasionally changes in normative
acceptability can provoke not merely a change in law but even a change in
understanding about fundamental rights.
As the model predicts, a
movement from the lower-right quadrant to the upper-right quadrant
provokes a further movement from the upper-right quadrant to the upperleft quadrant as well.

56
Compilation of Pew Research Center polls in response the question "Do you strongly favor,
favor, oppose or strongly oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?" compiled by
PollingReport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
57
Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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Same-Sex Marriage
llegal
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Norntve y Acceptab
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The legalization of medical marijuana use shows a similar pattern.
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s a vast but ever-narrowing majority of
respondents opposed legalization of medical marijuana use.
Should marijuana be legalized?

2000

Pew.

2010

58

58
marijuana

Compilation of Pew Research Center polls in response the question "Do you think the use of
http://
not?" compiled by PollingReport.com,
should be made legal, or
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Sometime around 2011 support for legalization moved into the
majority, and law followed in Colorado among other jurisdictions.o

www.pollingreport.com/drugs.htm.
59
Compilation of Gallup Polls in response the question "Do you think the use of marijuana
should be made legal, or not?" compiled by PollingReport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/
drugs.htm.
60
A note of caution is important here: for purposes of this analysis I am using support for the
legality of marijuana use as a proxy for the normative acceptability of marijuana use, but it is only a
proxy. Certainly another interpretation of the data is possible: that support for legalization represent a
more libertarian turn in politics, as opposed to a change in the normative acceptability of marijuana use.
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Medical Marijuana Use

approx. 2015

approx. 2011

V.

BULWARKS AND PRESSURE VALVES

A. Bulwarks
Bulwarks buttress law against pressure to change, despite a gap
between law and social norms. Because of bulwarks, behaviors that are
normatively unacceptable nonetheless remain legal. Broadly, there are two
types of bulwarks: political capture and the protection of fundamental
rights.
i. Capture
One bulwark against legal change is capture of the mechanisms of
change by those highly motivated to prevent it. Success for them means a
persistent misalignment of law and norms. This is a version of public
choice theory that is quite similar in many ways to the Marxist critique of
capitalist legal systems (or rather, the Marxist critique fits neatly within the
idea of public choice theory). Using our simple model, this phenomenon
would look like this:
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Bulwarks that Prevent Changes in Law to Reflect Norms:
Political Capture
Legal

N

Iliegal

elv~y Acpa~

Noaive'U&cpt

Consistent outrage over airline industry practices such as overbooking
flights and subsequently 'bumping' passengers seems to indicate the
violation of a deeply held norm-which might be characterized as 'a deal is
a deal.' Passengers consistently indicate bewilderment and outrage when
they discover that airlines have sold the same seat to more than one person.
Overbooking flights is very profitable for airlines. 6 ' Tickets purchased
many weeks in advance of a flight are often much less expensive than
tickets purchased shortly before a flight; therefore, by overbooking, airlines
can sell the same seat to different passengers at different rates and obtain a
higher price for the seat.62 The fear of overbooking allows airlines to upsell to customers who are willing to pay extra to eliminate the risk that they
will be bumped.63
Passengers who are involuntarily bumped are entitled to cash
compensation under regulations promulgated by the United States
64
Department of Transportation. However, many passengers are unaware of
those regulations, and airlines routinely avoid compensating involuntarily

61
See Sabri Ben-Achour,
Why in the World do Airlines Overbook Tickets?,
www.marketplace.org/topics/business/why-world-do-airlines-overbook-tickets.
62
See When to Buy Airline Tickets-Based on 1.5 Billion Airfares, CHEAPAIR.COM,
www.cheapair.com/blog/travel-tips/when-to-buy-airline-tickets-based-on-1-5-billion-airfares/
63
See Want a Seat Assignment on Delta? It Could Cost You.
MONEY.CNN.COM,
www.Money.cnn.com/2015/08/19/pf/delta-basic-economy-tickets/.
64
See Alexander Anolik, The Obligations of Airlines and the Rights of Passengers, ABA
JOURNAL, Aug. 12, 2015, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications.html.
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bumped passengers by soliciting volunteers who are offered inexpensive
vouchers.6 ' A person who is bumped voluntarily is not entitled to any form
of compensation.
Thus most bumped volunteers receive much less
compensation than they would if they were involuntarily bumped.
The practice remains perfectly legal despite its apparent normative
unacceptability, and despite several efforts at legal reform. 6 Moreover,
passengers have no private right of action under either federal law or
regulation, and state law is entirely preempted. Lacking other recourse,
some passengers have taken extreme measures in protest." It seems clear
that if it were not for the considerable influence of the airline industry, the
normative unacceptability of the practice would have led to it being
declared unlawful under most circumstances.

65

[d.

66

See Anolik, supra note 64 ("Insulation from state consumer protection laws, inefficient
enforcement of federal law, and Congress's refusal to pass a Passenger Rights Bill has allowed air
carriers to cut services year after year without compensation.").
67 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (holding that federal law preempts
any attempts by states to regulate airline services).
68 See Jessica Roy, Man Strips Naked in Protest after Being Bumped from Jamaica-Bound
Flight, N.Y. MAGAZINE (May 21, 2015, 12:37 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/05/manprotests-overbooked-flight-by-stripping.html#.
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ii. Protection of Fundamental Rights
A second bulwark against
the protection of fundamental
important duty courts perform
courts are so engaged, they act

the movement of law to align with norms is
rights by courts. In many ways, the most
is the defiance of the popular will. When
as bulwarks against the alignment of norms

and law.

One example of these phenomena might be American flag burning. It
seems beyond question that in the United States it is generally socially
unacceptable to burn the American flag. Forty-eight states had passed laws
making it illegal to desecrate the American flag before such laws were
struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson as a

violation of the First Amendment. 6 9 The general outrage generated by the
decision placed enormous pressure on Congress to change law to align with
norms. In 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act, criminalizing the
desecration of the American flag at the federal level.70 In 1990, however, in
United States v. Eichman, the United States Supreme Court struck the Act

down as a violation of the First Amendment.' In the years following,
Gallup polls show that between 1995 and 2006 public support for a
Constitutional amendment banning flag desecration never dipped below

69
70

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Flag Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 700.

71

United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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fifty-five percent, clearly indicating that flag desecration remained
normatively unacceptable.7 2 However, because the Supreme Court has
acted to protect fundamental rights, the gap between law and norms
persists. Unless support grows, proponents of aligning law with norms are
unlikely to succeed in obtaining the super-majority necessary to enact a
Constitutional amendment.
Another example might be campaign finance law. As the data below
shows, there can be no doubt that most Americans think the law of
campaign finance is fundamentally unfair. In a CBS / New York Times
poll released in June 2015, zero percent of respondents thought current
campaign finance law did not require any change.7 3 Only thirteen percent
thought minor changes were needed; 39% said fundamental changes were
needed; and fully forty-six percent said the entire system needed to be
rebuilt. Even more astonishing is that these extreme numbers have been
quite consistent for the 18 years the poll has been conducted.

72

Gallup Religion and Social Trends, July 6, 1999, Most Americans would Give Old Glory

Legal Protection,http://www.gallup.com/pollI3739/Most-Americans-Would-Give-OldGlory-Legal-Protection.aspx.
73
The New York Times / CBS News Poll, May 28-31, 2015, in response to question 34,
"Which of the following three statements comes closest to expressing your overall view of the way
political campaigns are funded in the United States: 1) On the whole, the system for funding political
campaigns works pretty well and only minor changes are necessary to make it work better. 2) There are
some good things in the system for funding political campaigns but fundamental changes are needed. 3)
The system for funding political campaigns has so much wrong with it that we need to completely
rebuild it.", available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/01/us/politics/document-poll-may28-31.html? r=0.
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How much change should there be in US campaign finance law?
60%

50%

MMinor
30%

MFundamental
Complete

20%

10

L

5/2015

7/2000

2/2000

4/1997

New York Times / CBS News Poll.74

In particular, respondents overwhelmingly felt that in order to make
elections in the United States fairer, there should be limits imposed on the
amount on money that both individuals and groups could contribute to
campaigns.

74
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Should group campaign donations be limited?
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Should individual campaign donations be limited?
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The New York Times / CBS News Poll, May 28-31, 2015 in response to question 36, "Which
one of the following two positions on campaign financing do you favor more: Limiting the amount of
money individuals can contribute to political campaigns, or allowing individuals to contribute as much
money to political campaigns as they'd like?, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/
01/us/politics/document-poll-may-28-3 1.html.
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The New York Times / CBS News Poll, May 28-31, 2015 in response to question 38,
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So: if vast majorities find unlimited campaign contributions unfair and
thus normatively objectionable, why hasn't the law changed to reflect
norms? In this instance, it depends upon who you ask, and when. Until the
2010 Citizens United decision, many might have said the bulwark
supporting law's resistance to this change was a political process captured
by the most powerful campaign contributors.
In its Citizens United
decision, however, the Supreme Court established by a 5-4 majority that
campaign contributions are encompassed within, and thus protected by, the
fundamental right of free speech.
B. Pressure Valves
In addition to bulwarks, there are "pressure valves" that can relieve the
pressure place on law to change to align with norms. Pressure valves
perform the opposite function of bulwarks: they relieve the pressure on law
to change when illegal behaviors are normatively acceptable.
To
understand pressure valves, it is critical to understand two related but
distinct phenomena.
The first phenomenon is the non-enforcement of law against behaviors
that are "acceptably deviant"; that is, behaviors that are illegal but
normatively acceptable. In the model, those behaviors reside in the upper
right quadrant. Acceptable deviance can take many forms and is so
persistent and pervasive in our lives that we hardly notice it. As Tamanaha
says, "the strongest argument in favor of dropping the requirement of
general obedience (in defining law) is that this condition is inconsistent
with social reality." 7 9 People's behavior is often bounded by the limits of
normative acceptability rather than the law.
Interestingly, sanctions are often imposed on behavior that is outside
the boundaries of normative acceptability, rather than the law. Behavior
that is illegal but normatively acceptable doesn't usually trigger formal
sanctions; behavior that is both illegal and normatively unacceptable often
does. Behavior that is legal but normatively unacceptable often triggers
informal sanctions; behavior that is normatively acceptable, whether legal
or illegal, usually does not.
We can see that in such commonplace behavior as driving.

"Currently, groups not affiliated with a candidate are able to spend unlimited amounts money on
advertisements during a political campaign. Do you think this kind of spending should be limited by
law, or should it remain unlimited?", available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/01/us/
politics/document-poll-may-28-31.html
77
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
78
[d
79

Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 145.
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Traffic Law& Driving
Legal

Nmni- Acceptable

Illegal

65 mph

65 - 79 mph

<65mph

>79mph

As the model above suggests, it is generally both legal to drive 65 mph
and socially acceptable (although just barely). On the other hand, it is both
illegal and generally socially unacceptable to drive much over 80 mph.
Doing so might well trigger both informal social sanctions-such as harsh
looks from other drivers or muttered curses-and a formal enforcement
response from the state, in the form of a speeding citation.
Take a moment to consider how extraordinary this commonplace
behavior really is. The state goes to the highly unusual effort of informing
its citizenry about the content of the law. Yet each person knows, without
being told, that the law as written does not, ultimately, set the boundaries of
behavior. The social acceptability of behavior sets its boundaries. And it is
all so commonplace, that most that most of us have lived with it our entire
lives and never even noticed.
Even more extraordinary, the state implicitly acknowledges that
system, and actually sanctions behavior that is outside the boundaries of
social acceptability, rather than merely outside the law. In fact, when the
state violates this implicit agreement by actually enforcing law rather than
the limits of social acceptability, the reaction is often outrage. For example,
the town of Waldo, Florida became known nationwide as a notorious speed
trap for consistently enforcing the actual speed limit on U.S. Route 301.so

80
See Jim Saunders, Florida Moves to Thwart Speed-Trap Towns like Waldo, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (March 5, 2015, 12:00 PM), www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/os-florida-endspeedtraps-201 50305-story.html.
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Public outrage was so great that private citizens erected a roadside billboard
outside of town warning drivers, and the town eventually disbanded the
police force entirely when it was revealed that the department had been
using a ticket quota system.
The second phenomenon is the enforcement of norms against
behaviors that we might call "unacceptably compliant;" that is, behaviors
that are legal but socially unacceptable. In the model, those behaviors ride
in the lower left quadrant. Again, consider driving: driving much under 65
mph, though legal, is very likely to trigger an informal enforcement
response through social sanctions, in the form of tailgating, flashing lights,
and or obscene gestures.
Driving behavior also helps illustrate some of the dangers that can
arise in the presence of pressure valves. The first is the danger of selective
enforcement. The second is the danger of vigilantism.

'Pressure Valves' that Relieve Pressure on Law to
Change to Reflect Norms
Legal

Illegal

Normtvely AccptbleEfrcmn

Nomtively Uneptble

i. Selective enforcement
The first potentially dangerous 'pressure valve' arises in the form of
selective enforcement. In other words, illegal but normatively acceptable
behavior might not provoke a change in law if the law is only selectively
enforced against insular groups. For the public, "the life of the law is in its

81
PM),
2200182.

See Waldo Votes to Disbandits Police Department, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sep. 30, 2014, 11:10
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/waldo-votes-to-disband-its-police-department/
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enforcement." 8 2 Selective enforcement places the pressure of divergence
entirely on selected groups. When illegal but normatively acceptable
behavior does not trigger an enforcement response - as is frequently the
case, since normative acceptability often drives enforcement-the majority
will not be motivated to change the law to reflect normative acceptability,
because it will not experience the divergence between normative
acceptability and law. That makes selective enforcement particularly
pernicious, because it is unlikely to cure itself through the political process.
For example, consider the example of driving behavior discussed
above. There is little incentive to change speed limits to reflect normatively
acceptable behavior, because speed limits are not actually enforced for the
majority of drivers in this country. Instead, the limits of acceptable
deviance are enforced.
But that is not true for all groups. Speed limits are routinely enforced
selectively, and often on the basis of the race of the driver. Racial profiling
of drivers is so pervasive that "driving while Black" has become part of the
common lexicon.8 For example, in Whren v. United States, the Supreme
Court heard the case of two African-American men who had been stopped
for a minor traffic violation.8 4 The defendants argued that the stop could
only have been motivated by their race, since their driving behavior,
although formally illegal, was well within the boundaries of acceptable
deviance and therefore would not have caused an enforcement response,
absent some other factor." The Court acknowledged that the defendants'
argument might well be true, but held that the Fourth Amendment did not
require an inquiry into police officers' subjective motivations in enforcing
the law. 6 Rather, the Court held that the only question relevant to the
officers' motivation to conduct the stop was whether they had a reasonable
belief that the defendants had engaged in formally illegal behavior. 7
As the controversy in Waldo, Florida demonstrates, if formal speed
limits are enforced across the board, the pressure to change quickly
becomes irresistible. On the other hand, if formal law is enforced only
selectively, there is no pressure caused by the divergence of legality and
normative acceptability.
We can predict that victims of selective
enforcement find no redress through the political process.
82 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose ofSociologicalJurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REv. 489,
514 (1912).
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See Christopher Ingraham, You Really Can Get Pulled Overfor Driving While Black, Federal
Statistics Show, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2014/09/
09/you-really-can-get-pulled-over-for-driving-while-black-federal-statistics-show/.
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ii. Vigilantism
Behavior that is legal but socially unacceptable might be prevented
through the informal enforcement of social norms. This occurs in varying
degrees of extremity, culminating in violent vigilantism.
If informal
sanctions in the form of vigilante acts successfully prevent legal but
normatively unacceptable behavior from occurring, then the tension created
by the divergence of legality and normative acceptability is relieved and
with it, the pressure on law to change.
Vigilantism is "a reaction to real or perceived deviance." 88
Criminologists have identified two distinct forms of vigilantism. Crime
control vigilantism occurs when private parties attempt to enforce criminal
laws that they consider under-enforced by state instrumentalities.
By
contrast, social control vigilantism occurs in order to control behaviors that
are not illegal, and therefore not subject to enforcement actions by state
instrumentalities, but violate social norms.89
Vigilantism in such cases is an effort at "norm enforcement, albeit in
ways inconsistent with the rational legal system." 90 The offenses at which
vigilantism is directed in such cases are not breaches of the law, but
breaches of normatively acceptable behavior. Since the state only enforces
law, vigilantes attempt to enforce those norms through social control.
One example of social control vigilantism is violence against lawful
abortion providers. As the data below show, Americans' beliefs with
regard to abortion are both deeply divided and remarkably intractable. To a
large minority of Americans, obtaining or providing an abortion is
tantamount to murder and therefore deeply unacceptable normatively.
Regardless, opponents of choice have been unable to achieve either a
majority position democratically, or to convince courts that the right to
choose is not protected by a woman's fundamental right of privacy.
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Unable to use law to enforce their normative preferences, some
opponents of choice have turned to vigilantism as a substitute. In effect,
vigilantism in this sense elevates the vigilantes' normative preferences to
the status of law, which vigilantes then enforce. For example, the former
slogan of the antiabortion activist group Operation Rescue made very clear
that its members were to treat lawful behavior-obtaining or providing an
abortion-as though it was unlawful: "If you think abortion is murder, act
like it." 93
According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, there were
more than 300 vigilante attacks on abortion providers in the United States
between 1973 and 2003.94 In response to the attacks, in 1994 the United
States passed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, making it
criminal offense to block abortion clinic access.95 Nonetheless, violent
attacks - arsons, bombings, shootings, assaults and murders-on providers
and provider facilities have continued. For example, in 2009, prominent
abortion provider George Tiller was assassinated by an antiabortion activist
with ties to Operation Rescue.96
Of 1043 counties in the United States with abortion providers, only 14
percent experienced violent attacks, but almost half of those experienced
more than one attack. 97 The area around Houston, Texas experienced the
most attacks. 98
This suggests that in areas where abortion is most
normatively objectionable, vigilantism is most likely.
Violent anti-abortion vigilantism has had success in enforcing its
vision of normative unacceptability. In areas where abortion providers have
been murdered, clinic-based abortions have declined by over 60 percent. 99
In counties in which non-murderous attacks have occurred, clinic-based
abortion rates dropped by approximately 9 percent. 00 Moreover, the effect
of violence on abortion rates has been is long lasting in the counties where
the violence occurs.1or
should be legal in all cases, legal in most cases, illegal in most cases, or illegal in all cases?" compiled
by PollingReport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm, pp. 2-3.
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VI. CONCLUSION

If the mirror thesis is correct, law should reflect norms. We can thus
predict that over time, if behaviors that were once both normatively
unacceptable and illegal become normatively acceptable, they should
become legal as well. Similarly, if behaviors that were once normatively
acceptable and legal become normatively unacceptable, they should become
illegal as well. That is to say, law should evolve to align with norms.
However, there are also predictable reasons why law might not evolve
to align with norms. Persistent gaps sometimes occur, so that some
behaviors that are normatively acceptable nonetheless remain illegal.
Similarly, sometimes behaviors that are normatively unacceptable
nonetheless remain legal.
Bulwarks are phenomena-such as the protection of fundamental
rights, and the capture of the political process by interest groups-that help
resist the pressure on law to align with norms, allowing behaviors that are
normatively unacceptable to remain legal.
Pressure valves are
phenomena-such as the non-enforcement of law against acceptably
deviant behavior, or the enforcement of norms against unacceptably
compliant behavior-that help relieve the pressure on law to align with
norms. Non-enforcement of law allows the persistence of illegal behaviors
that are normatively acceptable. Enforcement of norms can prevent legal
behaviors that are normatively unacceptable.
Persistent gaps between law and norms may be either features or bugs
in the system. Gaps that persist because of the protection of fundamental
rights are features of the system. Gaps that persist because of political
capture are usually bugs. Gaps that persist because of 'pressure valves'
may be either features or bugs, and their presence should alert us to
possibility of two particular dangers: selective enforcement and vigilantism.
In this way, we can use the mirror thesis and prediction both to better
understand the relationship between law and society, and to look for
dangers that might otherwise remain obscured.
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